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Emergency Powers of the Executive
In the United Arab Republict
SHERIF OMAR HASSAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE RuLE OF LAW AND EMERGENCY GOVERNMENT
The conflict between freedom and authority is an ancient and ever-
lasting one. The problem of regulating the relations between the rulers
and the ruled, or, to put it more technically, the relation between the
state and the individual, is as old as the emergence of the earliest political
societies.
The development of this relationship led to the establishment of the
basic principle of legality or limited government, government of laws and
not of men, where men are "ruled by law and not by caprice."'
The essence of the principle of legality is that acts and decisions of
public authorities cannot be valid or binding except to the extent that
.hey conform to the supreme rules of law. If they are violative of these
rules, they become illegal and it becomes the right of interested indi-
viduals to apply for their annulment and to recover the damage caused by
them.
This principle provides protection for individuals against public au-
thorities, and it achieves a reasonable balance between the necessities of
the exercise of power and the individual freedoms of citizens.
Even though the rule of law has become an article of political and
legal faith in all democracies, this rule is, like all other legal norms and
principles, a means to an end. The end is, generally speaking, the preser-
tAdapted from a chapter of Mr. Hassan's LL.M. thesis on file at The Cornell Law
School Library, Ithaca, New York.
* Lecturer in Law, Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law, Columbia Uni-
versity; LL.B. (1961), Diploma of Administrative Sciences (1962), Diploma of Islamic
Law (1963), Cairo University; LL.M. (1968) and Candidate for J.S.D. at The Cornell
Law School.
1. A. DICEY, LAW OF CONSTIUTION 189-90 (1964).
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vation of society and the fulfillment of its needs. If under certain cir-
cumstances the strict adherence to a particular rule of law puts the whole
society in danger, it becomes a matter of logic and necessity to relax this
particular rule of law or sacrifice it temporarily in order to preserve
society at large. This is the basic philosophy underlying the doctrine of
emergency powers. "The law is made for the state, not the state for the
law. If the circumstances are such that a choice must be made between the
two, it is the law which must be sacrificed to the state. Salus populi
suprema lex esto."2
When the preservation of the Union during the Civil War necessitated
measures unwarranted by the laws of the United States,3 President
Lincoln did not hestitate to go ahead, realistically declaring that
Every man when driven to the wall by a murderous assailant will
override all laws to protect himself, and this is called the great right
of self defense. So every government when driven to the wall by a
rebellion, will trample down a constitution before it allows itself to
be destroyed. This may not be constitutional law, but it is a fact.4
It is undoubtedly a fact that there are crises that can threaten the very
existence of a nation. It is also a fact that the system of government de-
signed to function under normal circumstances is often inadequate to
cope with the exigencies of great national crises, and therefore should be
changed to the degree necessary to achieve success in the nation's struggle
for survival. This change involves a government of stronger character,
that is, a government that does not adhere, literally, to the democratic
constitutional framework designed for normal conditions. "Democracy is
a child of peace and cannot live apart from its mother."
The theory that "necessity knows no law" might be an overstatement,
but undoubtedly it has more than a grain of logic and is a realistic
approach to the facts of political life. But the problem is, as Clinton
Rossiter eloquently stated it, that "Hitler could shout 'necessity' as easily
as Lincoln." 6 Therefore, the surrender of the rule of law to the so called
rule of necessity must be balanced by some carefully elaborated guide-
lines that keep life under necessity from being transformed into a law-
less life under a complete state of license.
Consequently, this writer submits that any constructive effort to study
2. J. BARTHELEMY, PROBLEMS DE POLITIQUE ET FINANCE DE GUERRE 121 (1915). How-
ever, I would rather use the terms "societies" and "basic needs" than the term "state"
used by Barthlemy, since throughout history this protection of the "interest of the
state" has been the preferred technique by which dictators relaxed en toto the rule
of law and substituted for it their own whims and caprice.
3. C. RossITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP 11 (1963).
4. Lincoln to Hodges, J. NICOLAY & J. HAY, COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN
508 (1905).
5. W. RAPPARD, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY 265 (1938); cited in RossiTER, supra note
3, at 5.
6. RossnTER, supra note 3, at 12.
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emergency powers should concern itself mainly with a critical analysis
of the doctrine of emergency powers in light of the conditions, limitations,
and review of such powers.
A study of the emergency powers of the executive in the United
Arabic Republic is particularly appropriate because of two essential
considerations. First, the system of emergency government in the United
Arab Republic, modeled on its French counterpart, is based on civil law
techniques which are quite different from those with which lawyers in
common law jurisdictions are familiar. Its study, therefore, has particular
significance for the comparative lawyer. Second, the United Arab Re-
public has had a unique experience with emergencies. The United Arab
Republic has witnessed a series of successive and prolonged emergencies
which have been extended over most of recent Egyptian history. The
country was indirectly involved in the two World Wars, directly involved
in three regional wars, engaged in a struggle for independence, and has
gone through a critical stage of transition following the Egyptian Revo-
lution of 1952 and the downfall of the monarchy.
It may not be an overstatement to say that emergencies or exceptional
circumstances there have ceased to be exceptional3 Whenever they have
occurred, these emergencies have led the government to invoke the emer-
gency powers in order to cope with them. The impact of successive and
prolonged emergency government on the constitutional order of a
democracy is a subject of great significance from the standpoint of consti-
tutionalism.
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The first institutionalized emergency system was introduced in Egypt
by the British authorities on November 2, 1914, after the outbreak of the
First World War. On December 18, 1914, Great Britain declared Egypt a
British Protectorate.8 An emergency system was established to secure the
7. A survey of the history of the state of siege and the state of emergency in the
United Arab Republic in the past thirty years provides illustration of this fact. A
state of siege was declared on December 1, 1939, and remained in force until October 4,
1945. Again a state of siege was declared on May 15, 1948, as a result of the war in
Palestine; it was extended on May 11, 1949, for a period of one year (date of termina-
tion was not available to the writer). The deterioration of the internal situation due
to British responses to the national struggle for independence had led the government
to declare a state of siege on January 26, 1952. It remained in force until June 20, 1956.
On November 1, 1956, and due to the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt, a state of
emergency was declared. It was lifted on March 24, 1964. At the outbreak of the
Arab-Israeli War, a state of emergency was declared on June 5, 1967, and is still in
force at the time of preparing this paper.
8. On the Protectorate, see Mc Ilwraith, The British Protectorate of Egypt 7 FORT-
NIGHTLY REV., New Series 375-83 (1920).
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British and allied forces, to guarantee the availability of ports, airports,
supplies, and means of transportation required for their operations, to
reduce the powers of the existing government to the administration of
domestic affairs, and finally to obstruct the growing national struggle for
independence. As a result, the civil government's powers were suspended
to the extent deemed necessary to serve these goals.
The Egyptians resented the Protectorate, and the military measures
created nationwide discontent. Censorship of the press, martial law, and
restrictions on Egyptian legislative bodies made the people resentful.
No sooner was the Armistice signed than the Egyptians who refused
to take advantage of British difficulties in order to secure national free-
dom thought they had the right to demand that the Allies' victory should
be shared by the "protected" nations. The Egyptian Nationalists soon
began their struggle for the abolition of the Protectorate and for in-
dependence. The answer given to the delegation asking for independence
was the deportation of the head of the delegation, Sa'd Zaghloul, and
three of his followers. Public opinion in Egypt was shocked, and the
action of Britain brought the explosive situation to its full climax.
Strikes and riots broke out and quickly spread throughout the country.
The forcefulness of Egypt's reaction compelled the British to envisage
for the first time a settlement of the "Egyptian question."
The British government appointed a special Inquiry Commission head-
ed by Lord Milner to study the causes of the disorders and to examine
the whole question and to recommend steps which should be taken to
regularize the situation in Egypt.9 Lord Milner advised his government
to abandon the Protectorate and suggested replacing it by a "perpetual
alliance." The recommendation took years to reach its final implementa-
tion.
At the suggestion of Lord Allenby, Lloyd George's government pub-
lished the Declaration of February 22, 1922, recognizing Egyptian in-
dependence and sovereignty, but including four reservations. These
reservations concerned the security of communications of the British
Empire in Egypt, the defense of Egypt against any aggression or inter-
ference, the protection of foreign and minority interests, and the status
of the Sudan, which was left to his Britanic Majesty's discretion until
the conclusion of a future agreement.10 On March 1, 1922, Egypt was
proclaimed an independent kingdom, and work was started on the
country's first constitution, which, modeled on that of Belgium, was
promulgated on April 19, 1923. On June 26, 1923, the Act No. 15 of the
year 1923 "concerning the State of Siege" was promulgated.
9. Egypt and the United Nations, Report of the Study Group established by the
Egyptian Society of International Law 7 (1957).
10. Id. at 8.
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The Act was closer to military law than to the political state of siege
as established in France. Britain had greatly influenced the Act in this
respect, motivated by the desire to protect her interests after indepen-
dence by regulating the state of siege in a manner that would inflict a
heavy burden on the unwillingly proclaimed independence."
The Act of 1923 was substituted by the "State of Siege Act No. 533 of
the year 1954," which was in turn replaced by the "Emergency State Act
No. 162 of the year 1958." Both Acts were substantially derived from the
Act of 1923.
The first section of this study will deal with the "Emergency State
Act No. 162 of the year 1958." The second will review the judicial doc-
trine of necessity as it passed through three phases: 1) before the civil
courts; 2) before the Court of Administrative justice after the establish-
ment of the Council of State; and 3) before the Supreme Court of Ad-
ministrative Justice which was established within the Council of Stare
in 1955.12
II. STATUTORY EMERGENCY POWERS
A. THE EMERGENCY STATE ACT No. 162 OF THE YEAR 1958
The first Constitution of the Egyptian Republic went into effect on
June 24, 1956. Article 144 of this Constitution provided that
The President of the Republic may declare a state of emergency
according to the law. Such a declaration should be submitted to the
National Assembly within fifteen days of its announcement, and the
Assembly takes whatever decision it deems necessary thereon. If the
National Assembly is dissolved, such a declaration should be placed
before the new Assembly when it meets at its first sitting.
Under this constitutional provision the Emergency State Act No. 162
was promulgated on September 27, 1958. The general features of this
Act are similar to those of the Act of 1923, though the circumstances
which influenced the framers of the latter Act' 3 were not existing in
1958. However, it should be borne in mind that this Act was framed
under a transitory stage of constitutional and political evolution which
required a government of strong character, a government empowered
with all the powers that would make it capable of undertaking the
11. For a detailed study of the Act, see S. Hassan, Emergency Powers of the Executive
in France, the United Arab Republic and the United States -A Comparative Study
94-101; Thesis presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University
for the Degree of Legum Magister (1968).
12. See note 19 infra.
13. See pp. 48-49 infra.
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heavy tasks required to fulfill the aspirations of the Egyptian people on
the eve of the revolution.
B. CIRCUMSTANCES INVOKING THE STATE OF EMERGENCY
Article 1 of the Act authorizes the President of the Republic to de-
clare a state of emergency whenever the public security or order is en-
dangered in the territories of the Republic or in portions thereof, be it a
result of war, or a threat of war, of internal disturbances, of public
calamities, or the spread of an epidemic. By comparing this provision to
Article I of the Act of 1923,14 we notice that the new Act increased the
cases in which the state of emergency could be invoked. While actual
war was one of the two cases provided for in the State of Siege Act of
1923, the Act of 1958 added the case of "a threat of war." The term is
extremely flexible, a quality of questionable desirability considering the
very strong powers vested in the executive under the declaration of the
state of emergency. Moreover, the legislature might well have left the
circumstances of "public calamities" and "spread of an epidemic" to be
dealt with through the ordinary police powers of the administration.
Floods, earthquakes, and epidemics undoubtedly need urgent and strict
measures to limit or eliminate their ruinous consequences, but the
ordinary police powers of the administration provide adequate measures
without any need to subject the society to the harsh measures provided in
the Emergency State Act.
It should be also borne in mind, when considering Article I, that a
long line of judicial decisions in Egypt has established the rule that the
declaration of the state of siege or the state of emergency is an act of
sovereignty or of government to which judicial review does not extend.
Such a judicial rule makes the legislative use of such loosely defined
phrases, under which the executive possesses unlimited discretion, most
undesirable. It was for this reason that a unique argument was intro-
duced by the late Professor Sayed Sabry in several hearings before the
Court of Administrative Justice to the effect that the act of declaring
the state of siege itself is not exempt from judicial review. This view was
based on the premise that the legislative enumeration of the circum-
stances under which the state of siege could be invoked means that the
President's discretion to declare the state of siege is conditioned by the
existence of one of the circumstances enumerated in the provision. It
follows that the Presidential declaration of the state of siege should be
subjected to the court's review to enforce this limitation, otherwise the
14. Art. I of the Act of 1923 authorized the declaration of a state of siege whenever
the public security and order are put in peril resulting from the menace of an
invasion by an enemy's armed forces, or from internal disturbances.
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provision enumerating these circumstances would be of no practical
value. However, this sound view was never accepted by either the
Egyptian courts or by Egyptian jurists.15
C. DECLARATION AND TERMINATION
Article 144 of the Constitution of 1956 authorized the President of the
Republic to declare a state of emergency and provided that such a
declaration must be submitted to the National Assembly within fifteen
days following its announcement. The Assembly then can make what-
ever decision it deems necessary. Following Article 45 of the Constitution
of 1923,16 Article 144 places the power to declare a state of emergency in
the hands of the head of the state, with the one difference that here the
authority to make the declaration is gi-en to the same authority which
the law had vested with the emergency powers. The declaration, how-
ever, is to be submitted to the National Assembly within fifteen days
following its announcement.
Article 144 did not provide for the case in which the state of emer-
gency is declared when the Assembly is not in session; however, it is
understood that it must be invited to assemble. In the event the Assem-
bly is dissolved, the declaration should be placed before the new As-
sembly when it meets at its first sitting. Article 2 provides that a Presi-
dential decree could terminate the state of emergency.
D. EFFECTS OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY
Despite the fact that Article 2 of the Act of 1923 was subject to severe
criticism for the very vast powers it vested in the state of siege authorities
with the resulting menace this constituted to rights and liberties of
Egyptian citizens, and despite the very hard experience of Egyptian
democracy under the said Article, Article 3 of the Emergency State Act
of 1958 vested even greater powers in the President whenever a state of
emergency is declared.
Section 1 of Article 3 authorizes the President to restrain the freedoms
of assembly, moving, and residing, to arrest persons deemed to be
security risks, to authorize search of persons and places regardless of the
procedures provided for in the Criminal Procedures Act, and to order the
performance of work.
15. S. EL-TAMAWY, ADMINISTRATIVE AcTs 157-58 (1966); T. EL-GARF, THE PRINCIPLE
OF LEGALITY 193 (1963).
16. Art. 45 of the Constitution of 1923 vested the power to declare a state of siege in
the King. The emergency powers, however, were vested in a military commander to be
appointed by the King. The consistent Egyptian practice has been to appoint the
Prime Minister as a general military commander.
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Section 2 authorizes the President to order the censorship of all types
of correspondence, the censorship of the press, of all printed matters and
scripts, and of all means of expression, advertisement and propaganda
before their circulation. Section 3 gives the President the authority to fix
the opening and closing hours of all public establishments and to order
the closing of such establishments. The President is further authorized by
Sections 4, 5, and 6 to order the seizure of property and sequestration of
companies and enterprises, to direct the surrender of arms and munitions,
to evacuate certain localities, and to regulate all means of transportation.
Such are the unprecedented powers Article 3 vests in the President
during a state of emergency. Moreover, the last section of the same
Article authorizes the President to enlarge the scope of these powers,
but his decision in this respect must be submitted to the National As-
sembly at its first meeting.
Another effect of the state of emergency is the devolution upon the
military authorities of the police powers exercised by civil authorities
under normal circumstances. Article 4 provides that the enforcement of
the orders of the President passes from the exclusive hands of civil
authorities to the armed forces as well as the police.
The Emergency State Act of 1958 established a body of exceptional
courts similar in structure, powers, and procedures to the military courts
established in the Act of 1923, but given the name "Courts of the Security
of the State." Under Article 9 the President is authorized to refer to
these Courts all cases involving crimes committed in violation of ordinary
law statutes.
Violations of the orders of the President of the Republic are punish-
able by penalties provided in these orders. Such penalties, however, are
not to exceed fifteen years of hard labor or four thousand pounds. In the
event the orders are silent as to the penalties, violations of them may
be punished by imprisonment for not more than six months, or a fine
not to exceed fifty pounds, or both penalties.
It should be noted in this respect that the power of the executive to
prescribe penalties was more limited under the Act of 1923. While the
penalties prescribed by the executive were not to exceed eight years of
imprisonment under the 1923 Act, the maximum limit under the 1958
Act was raised to fifteen years. The breadth of the limits established by
this latter Act should be viewed and appraised in light of two essential
facts. First, no adequate standards exist to govern the President's
authority in prescribing penalties, save the very general and vague
standard of "public interest," which is no standard at all. Realistically
one should agree with Professor Davis that "sometimes telling the Agency
to do what is in the public interest is the practical equivalent of in-
structing it, 'Here is the problem. Deal with it.' ,17 The problem here,
17. K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 33 (1959).
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however, is not one that should be left to the executive to "deal with"
as he deems fit; we are dealing with the establishment of crimes and the
prescription of penalties, with the liberties and rights of citizens, the
regulation of which should be purely in the hands of the legislature. If
necessities and extraordinary circumstances call for the delegation of this
legislative power to the executive, precise and adequate standards should
be attached to the delegation.
Second, the violators of the orders and declarations of the President
are to be tried before the "Courts of the Security of the State" established
by Article 7 of the Act and consequently subjected to the summary pro-
cedures of these courts. This fact should have persuaded the legislature
not to grant to the President such wide discretion in establishing crimes
and prescribing penalties.
In addition, it should be noted, with regard to the problem of dele-
gation under exceptional circumstances, that Article 136 of the Con-
stitution of 1956 provides:
In exceptional cases, and in virtue of an express delegation by the
Assembly, the President of the Republic may issue ordinances which
will have the force of law. This delegation should be for a fixed per-
iod, and the objects and basis of such ordinances should be precisely
determined.
This provision was introduced for the first time by the Constitution of
1956 which also reiterated the provision of Article 41 of the Constitution
of 1923 concerning the ordinances of necessity. Article 135 of the Con-
stitution of 1956 provides that
If during the Assembly's recess or during its dissolution, urgent
measures have to be promptly adopted, the President could enact the
appropriate ordinance which will have the force of law.
Such ordinances should, however, be submitted to the Assembly
within fifteen days of their promulgation if the Assembly is in session.
If the Assembly has been dissolved, the ordinance shoild be submitted
at its first session.
If such ordinances are not submitted to the Assembly they become
retroactively null and void.
If such ordinances are submitted and are not ratified by the Assem-
bly, they again become retroactively null and void unless the Assembly
decides to settle whatever consequences that may have resulted through
the application of such ordinances during a preceding period.
Admittedly, the above cited two articles have provided sufficient and
adequate safeguards in the parliamentary control of the President's exer-
cise of the delegated legislative power. However, in examining the legis-
lative power granted to the President by Article 5 of the Emergency State
Act, together with his legislative power under these constitutional pro-
visions, one may be justified in concluding that emergencies under the
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Egyptian system do more than "modify" the principle of separation of
powers.
E. LIMITATIONS ON THE STATE OF EMERGENCY
The first limitation on the state of emergency is provided in Article
144 of the Constitution, which requires the submission of the declaration
of the state of emergency to the National Assembly within fifteen days
of its announcement and authorizes the Assembly to take whatever
action it deems necessary. Therefore, the Assembly is authorized to
suspend the state of emergency if the executive declares it without suf-
ficient reason.
The second limitation is established by Article 2 of the Act, which re-
quires that the declaratory decree should designate the specific areas to
which the state of emergency applies. This provision prevents further
abusive or careless extension of the state of emergency to areas not ac-
tually in a state of emergency.
A third and most significant limitation was established, for the first
time, by Article 2 which provides that the declaratory decree should
state the circumstances for which the state of emergency had been de-
clared. It would appear that the mere enumeration of the kinds of cir-
cumstances that would warrant a declaration of emergency implies that
any such declaration aimed at circumstances other than those expressly
specified is not authorized under the law. This limitation means, more-
over, that the declaration of the state of emergency to face one specific
circumstance warrants only those measures necessary to deal with this
very circumstance.
Finally, there is the limitation laid down by the courts in reviewing
the acts issued under the state of emergency. Both civil and administra-
tive courts have always held that the declaration of the state of siege is
an act of state or of government exempt from all judicial review.18 As
for the acts issued under the state of siege, it has been established by both
administrative and civil courts that they are subject to judicial review
and have been set aside on different grounds. Judicial policy in this re-
spect has passed through different stages that will be dealt with in the
following section.
III. THE JUDICIAL DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY AND REVIEWABILITY
The judicial doctrine of necessity has passed through three phases:
18. Council of State, Court of Administrative Justice, March 7, 1956, Case No. 4079
(Year 7); also Court of Adminstrative Justice, April 26, 1957, Case No. 3715 (Year 7).
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1) before the civil courts, 2) before the Court of Administrative Jus-
tice after the establishment of the Council of State, and 3) before the
Supreme Court of Administrative Justice, which was established within
the Council of State in 1955 as the court of last resort in administrative
cases. 19
A. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CIVIL COURTS
The Egyptian civil courts have established the rule that both the
State and the individuals should abide by the rule of law.20 Should the
government infringe upon the rule of law, its enactments are null and
void, and victims of such violations are entitled to indemnity. However,
in several decisions the courts admit that the administration should exer-
cise broader powers and greater discretion under abnormal circumstances
constituting menace and threat to public order and security. Under such
circumstances, the administration can take any necessary measure to
cope with the situation without being required to adhere literally to the
laws and regulations if such adherence would impair the administration's
ability to maintain public order and protect the society. The measures
taken under such circumstances are not to be considered violative of the
laws, since such laws are formulated to be applied in normal circum-
stances and do not provide for measures to be taken under abnormal and
exceptional circumstances, provided the extraordinary measures are
aimed at the protection and maintenance of public interests.21 Applying
this theory, the Court of Cassation 22 decided that officials clothed with
police powers can, to prevent crime, take all necessary measures restrain-
ing the freedom of individuals as long as such measures are justified
by the circumstances of the case. 23
This theory, however, represented a compromise between two opposing
views with regard to the measures of necessity taken by the authorities
holding the police powers. Adversely affected individuals claimed that
19. The Council of State was established by the law No. 112 on "The Council of
State" issued in 1946; while the Supreme Court of Administrative Justice was estab.
lished by law No. 165 on "The Council of State" issued in 1955.
20. Indigenous Court of Appeals, Nov. 4, 1924, B. Ass'N REv. (Year 4), No. 627, 829.
21. Cairo Indigenous Court, February 6, 1934, B. Ass'N REv. (Year 15), No.
236, at 505, and May 11, 1935, B. ASS'N REV. (Year 15), No. 299, at 640; Mixed
Court of Appeals, June 9, 1898, Review of Legislation and Mixed Courts (Year 10), 316.
22. Egypt adopts the French system of cassation. The Court of Cassation is the court
of last resort in civil, commercial, and criminal cases. Appeals to the Court
has only the power to "casser," i.e. to break, the judgment below and upon doing so
must remand the case to an intermediate appellate court. On the French system of
appeals see R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAw 229-34 (1959).
23. Court of Cassation, March 22, 1935, B. Ass'N REv. (Year 14), No. 155, at
370.
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their rights and liberties could not be restrained except by the authority
of laws and regulations and that any measure, regardless of its justifica-
tion, restraining their liberties in violation of the law, should be held an
administrative trespass, voie de fait, 24 not covered by the administrative
immunity. And, as such, the courts are empowered to declare it null and
void. The Egyptian civil courts unanimously rejected this view on the
ground that it contradicts the essence and spirit of law and public order,
obstructs the due exercise of police power, and leads to outright anarchy.
The courts held that as long as these measures are taken under a state of
necessity, and as long as they are the only means available to maintain
public order and safety, they should be held valid.25
The government based its defense in such cases on the grounds that
the measures of administrative police restraining public liberties, though
administrative in nature and treated as such under normal circumstances.
when taken under exceptional circumstances in defense of the existence
of the state, become acts of sovereignty or political questions immune
from all control, no matter how violative of the laws they might be. This
confusion between acts of sovereignty and acts of necessity appears in
some court decisions adopting the classical theory which based the theory
of acts of sovereignty on the concept of force majeure. According to
this theory, all governmental actions aiming at the security of the citizens
inside and outside the country are acts of sovereignty.26 This trend, how-
ever, was not accepted by the majority of the civil courts which consider
the urgent measures of administrative police under exceptional circum-
stances ordinary acts of administration and not acts of sovereignty.
B. THE DOCTRINE OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE
A significant point with respect to the judicial trends in controlling
legislative acts in Egypt is that almost all judicial activity in this field
deals with a single problem. The central issue in all cases of judicial re-
view of legislation has been the constitutionality of laws prohibiting any
legal action attacking certain governmental enactments. The frequency
of such "jurisdiction-limiting" legislation is perhaps due to the adoption
of a general principle of governmental liability under political and social
conditions that frequently call for more active and even summary treat-
ment of exceptional emergency conditions.
Such laws are almost systematically adopted in Egypt at the end of a
period of emergency or state of siege as a means of covering all govern-
24. On the notion of voie de fait, see B. SCHWARTZ, FRENcH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
THE COMMON LAW WoLD 72 (1954); E.LAFEluUERE, TRAITE DE LA JURISDICTON ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE Er DES RiECoURS CONTENTIEUX 479 (1896).
25. Cairo Indigenous Court, August, 1936, cited by EL-GARF, supra note 15, at 188.
26. T. EL-GAIU', supra note 15, at 189.
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mental liability for acts performed during the emergency period.27 In the
first five or six years of its activity in judicial review, the Egyptian Coun-
cil of State took the position that such laws are unconstitutional. Within
the last ten years, however, there has been a marked departure from that
sound position.
The arguments advanced by the Council in support of its two dif-
ferent theses will be discussed against a background of the United States
Supreme Court's decisions dealing with similar problems.
1. Unconstitutionality of Laws Preventing Every Legal Action
In two famous decisions rendered on June 21 and 30, 1952, the Court
of Administrative Justice declared laws preventing every legal action to
be repugnant to the Constitution and to the basic notion of limited
government. In the second of these cases28 where the decision was ren-
dered by the whole Court (all the chambers united), the Court had be-
fore it decree-law No. 64 for the year 1952, which undertook to prevent
any legal action which would bring into question any act, order, or
decision of the Military Governor appointed under the authority of the
State of Siege Act. The particular act at issue was a decision of that
governor ordering the plaintiff to remain in forced residence in his coun-
try estate. In declaring the decree-law unconstitutional, the Court estab-
lished the following two principles:
1. The absolute denial of access to the courts in such a general and
complete way is, in effect, an absolute exemption from responsibility ac-
corded to the particular governmental agency at issue. Such general
exemption covers all enactments, even those in violation of the author-
izing statute itself. Such an exemption with its corollary result of de-
priving individuals of their rights to judicial remedies is violative of the
people's rights to liberty, equality, and the access to the remedial pro-
cess of the judiciary, the very rights guaranteed to them by the Consti-
tution.
2. Judicial review is the only effective means of control over the ad-
ministration. Every system or institution provided for in the Constitu-
tion, and determined by law (the Court here is referring to the institu-
tion of the state of siege) is subject to the principle of legality, no matter
how exceptional it may be.
The constitutionality of laws limiting the jurisdiction of courts raises
a very delicate and complicated problem. This delicacy was very aptly
27. See for example the Decree-law No. 64, May 15, 1952; Law No. 270, June 20, 1956;
Law No. 99, September 1, 1963.
28. Council of State, June 30, 1952. Case No. 1026. The case is reported in the
French Year 6. "Bulletin de Legislation et de Jurisprudence Egyptiennes" 1952, No. 11
at 344.
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described by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Cary v.
Curtis.29 There the Court found itself in the following dilemma: "The
Supremacy of the Constitution over all officers and authorities ... and
the sanctity of the rights guaranteed by it, none will question." But on
the other hand,
the judicial power ... although it has its origin in the Constitution
is dependent for distribution and organization, and for the modes of its
exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who possess the sole
power of creating tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court) for the
exercise of the judicial power, and of investing them with jurisdiction
either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdic-
tion from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress
may seem proper for the public good. To deny this position would be
to elevate the judicial over the legislative branch of the government,
and to give to the former powers limited by its own discretion
merely.3 0
To the Egyptian Council of State, however, the decree-law at issue did
more than regulate jurisdiction. It was directed towards the impairment
and confiscation of personal rights by denying them every practical sig-
nificance, and it reached this aim through the absolute denial of judicial
remedy.
2. Validation of Absolute Denial of Judicial Remedies in Particular
Cases3l
In three leading decisions rendered on June 8, June 29, 1957, and
July 12, 1958, the Egyptian Supreme Court of Administrative Justice
practically overruled the Council's previous decisions, approaching the
problem from a totally different viewpoint.
In the first case, the Court upheld Article 291 of the law No. 345 of
1956 which regulated the Egyptian universities and declared inadmissible
any action at law aiming at the annulment or suspension of any order
or decision of university authorities concerning their students. 3 2
29. 44 U.S. 08How.) 236, 245 (1845).
30. See the discussion of the whole problem in Hart, The Power of Congress to
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV.
1362 (1953).
31. For an elaborate and most accurate analysis of the decision cited below, see A.
ABOULMAGED, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EGYPT 607-23
(1960).
32. Case No. 1789 (Year II), June 8, 1957. In upholding this provision, the court said:
a) "The mere denial of judicial relief is not denial of the substantive right involved ...
so, Art. 291 is not violative of students' rights ... as regulated by statutes and regula-
tons."
b) "It is the province of the legislation to declare personal rights, and provide for
remedies, judicial or non-judicial, aiming at their protection."
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In the second decision, rendered on June 29, 1957, the Court sustained
the constitutionality of Art. 2 of the law No. 600 of the year 1953 denying
any and every judicial remedy to public employees summarily dismissed
under its provisions.33
c) "Such legislation does not deprive applicants (the students) of their right to equality
under the law. Equality means the right to receive the same legal treatment under
the same legal circumstances. It cannot be measured by comparison between them (the
students) and other categories of individuals unrelated to university education." The
Court here gives a definition of the right to equal treatment under the law, that seems
incomplete and inadequate to meet the requirements of a true notion of equality.
According to the Court, the mere fact that legislative classification is on a general and
not an individual basis exempts it from being discriminatory. If classification on in-
dividual basis is justly condemned, still, however, legislative distinction between groups
or categories may not necessarily be justified. A more reasonable approach has been
taken by the United States Supreme Court: "The ultimate test of validity is not whether
(there are differences between the different groups classified) . . . but whether the
differences between them are pertinent to the subject with respect to which the classi-
fication is made." Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580
(1935). See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
33. Case No. 161 (Year III), June 29, 1957. In its decision the Court declared the
following principles: a) A distinction should be made between absolute confiscation of
the right to have access to the courts, and the mere limitation of courts' jurisdiction. b)
The contention that Art. 2 is unconstitutional cannot be sustained because an em-
ployee has no constitutional right to the public employment. To ask for the court's
protection on constitutional grounds one must show that his particular right is
guaranteed by the Constitution, and that its judicial protection is provided for in the
Constitution itself ... "Public servants have no vested right to their job comparable to
the right of ownership. Their privilege of remaining in office is contingent upon the
government's will; which will is determined by considerations of public interest."
The issue here is the impact of preventing all judicial action attacking particular
enactments on the principle that all governmental activity should be within and in
accordance to law and the Constitution. The court here tried to avoid the problem by
claiming that the Constitution guarantees only "rights" and not privileges. And as it
is recognized in Egyptian legal theory that an employee has no "right" to the public
employment, then it follows that he cannot validly invoke any constitutional protec-
tion. This argument has been advanced by the United States Supreme Court to uphold
summary discharge of public employees on the ground that the due process clause
with its ingredients applies only to rights and not to bounties and privileges. Bailey v.
Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by equally divided Court, 341 U.S.
918 (1951). See Dotson, The Emerging Doctrine of Privilege in Public Employment,
15 PUB. AD. REV. 77 (1955); cited by W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRrATIVE LAW
795-96 (1960).
It seems, however, that the whole problem cannot be so easily solved by the appli-
cation of an oversimplified doctrine. (For a somewhat similar approach, see Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) where
he says, "It does not at all follow that because the Constitution does not guarantee
right to public employment, a city or a state may resort to any scheme for keeping
people out of such employment. To describe public employment as a privilege does
not meet the problem"). The problem, properly viewed, has two different phases, one
related to the individual and the other related to the administration. While the nature
of the employee's legal status meets the first part or side of the problem, it does not,
however, meet the other. It can never be maintained and it actually has never been,
that the power of government to dismiss public employees summarily is an absolute
and boundless one. A minimum requirement for such dismissal to be valid, is "to be
related to some public interest and to be based on considerations related to the dis-
missed employee." Court of Administrative Justice, Case No. 503, Year 7, November
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In the third and probably the most important of these cases, decided
on July 12, 1958, the Supreme Court of Administrative Justice upheld the
constitutionality of Art. 3 of the law No. 70 of the year 1956 declaring
inadmissible any suit or action attacking any measure taken by the
authorities in the exercise of their power under the state of siege. The
inferior court decision had invalidated this provision on the same grounds
elaborated by the two leading decisions of 1952, adding that "The prin-
ciple of legality is a right of all citizens . . . the denial of all remedies is,
in effect, authorizing the government to act in a lawless manner. It is in
nobody's interest to protect unlawful acts of the government." In re-
versing this decision, the Supreme Court held that a distinction should be
made between absolute confiscation of the right to have access to the
courts and the mere limitation of courts' jurisdiction. The legislature
has an undisputed power to withhold jurisdiction because it is the "Con-
stitutional organ or agency" that creates courts and invests them with
jurisdiction. The Court also held that "the mere denial of judicial relief
is not denial of the substantive right involved."
As to the decisions of 1952, the Court distinguished the two cases on
the ground that there the court was dealing with a decree-law, technically
administrative in nature, by which the government was trying to exempt
itself from every liability under the emergency proclamation. Such exemp-
tion could only be achieved by a "law" not by a decree-law. In other
words, to the court of 1958. a law may validly exempt the government
from every liability for actions performed under the state of siege. In
its decision the Supreme Court compares such laws to the English prac-
tice of "Indemnity Acts." Finally, the Court took refuge in Art. 190 of
the Constitution of 1956 which provided that
All rules prescribed by laws, decrees, ordinances, regulations and
decisions prior to the issuing of the present Constitution shall remain
valid. They may, however, be abrogated or amended according to the
principles and procedure established in the present Constitution.34
3. Appraisal of the New Position of the Court
From a purely procedural or formal standpoint, the Egyptian Supreme
Court is correct in holding that the legislature has a right to regulate the
jurisidiction of all courts. One form of regulation is, of course, with-
holding certain subjects from the courts' jurisdiction. This point was
23, 1954. The mere existence of legislation regulating such dismissal is. in itself, a
limitation on the government's discretion. And the very law challenged in the case is
certainly a limitation on the government's power. The promulgation of thee laws
would be worse than a mockery if the government can violate them, and the violation
be sanctioned in the indirect way of denial of judicial review.
34. Case No. 9-29 (Year III), July 12, 1958.
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clearly elaborated by the United States Supreme Court in 1850.35 "Courts
created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute con-
fers." In the famous McCardle case decided in 1868,36 Chief Justice Chase
took the position recently taken by the Egyptian Supreme Court. In that
case, he declared that "Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when
it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of an-
nouncing the fact and dismissing the cause."
In the McCardle case, and under the American system, however, the
issue is rendered even less clear by the existence of the federal system
and two bodies of courts. Moreover, the reference made in the Consti-
tution to the "one Supreme Court" may give it a more solid basis than
that given to the Egyptian Council of State, a mere creature of the
legislature. These concessions, however, do not meet the real problem. It
remains to examine the very essence of the attacked legislation herein
referred to. When considering the impact of denying all judicial remedies
on the substantive rights involved, the court distinguishes between the
"right" and its "remedy," pretending that the denial of remedies does
not touch or affect the substance of the right involved. This sophisticated
distinction cannot overshadow the fact that from the standpoint of the
individuals affected the practical result of denying every judicial remedy
is to indirectly impair the substantive right involved. "The bald truth
is... that the power to regulate jurisdiction is actually a power to regul-
late rights, rights to judicial process, whatever those are, and substantive
rights generally."37 The question then arises as to whether the Constitu-
tion gives an individual right of access to courts. This writer would
answer with an unqualified "yes." To declare otherwise would be to
deny all significance to enforceable constitutional rights. The denial of
all remedies is in effect a "deconstitutionalization" of the particular sub-
stantive rights. This writer would go even further and contend that the
right of access to courts to protect one's rights has a preferred position
among other rights because it is a sine qua non of the doctrine of con-
stitutionalism and government under law.
In conclusion, in the first five years under the doctrine of judicial
review the Egyptian Council of State had shown an admirably liberal
attitude towards the protection of personal rights against governmental
encroachments. In 1951 an eminent American judge of the former
Egyptian "mixed courts," Justice Brinton, thought that
35. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). See also Lockerty v. Phillips, 319
U.S 182 (1943), upholding a denial of jurisdiction to federal district courts and state
courts to enjoin the enforcement of OPA regulations, a statutory procedure having
been provided for administrative protest and appeal to a specially constituted court
of appeals.
36. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
37. Hart, supra note 30, at 1371.
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If, as there is good reason to hope, the institution continues its labors
in the same spirit of judicial independence and with the same energy
and effectiveness as in the past few years, its contribution to the prob-
lem of constitutional government in Egypt and to the capital issue of
the protection of individual rights . . . will be of the highest order.:-'
In the light of the recent cases discussed here, however, may it not be
concluded that the Council is retreating to a more docile and conservative
position? To give a fair answer, we have to recall that under a transition
stage of constitutional and political evolution or even revolution, and
where the principle of constitutional government is still in the course of
development, it is extremely imprudent to urge the judiciary to practice
activism motivated by a hasty desire to have a second "American Supreme
Court" transplanted in completely different soil. It is useful, however,
to remind the highest court that its adherence to the self-restraint rules
elaborated, though not systematically observed by the United States
Supreme Court, is sufficient and adequate to meet the delicacy of its
relations to the other branches of the government. The court has certain
duties that should never be sacrificed or relaxed except under the strictest
necessity. It is under difficult and delicate circumstances that the pro-
tection of the Supreme Court is most needed, otherwise it would be a
fair-weather institution deserting the people it is to serve in moments of
their greatest need.
38. J. BRINTON, THE COUNCIL OF STATE IN EGYPT 19 (1953).
